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 Introduction 
Collectivism is often highlighted by scholars as one of the features of 
the Russian national character and mentality. They regard it as an informal, 
embedded institution of the Russian society which should be taken into 
consideration during socio-economic transformations. Many contemporary 
Russian economists, sociologists, and public leaders consider artelnost, i.e. 
a specific propensity for working collectively in solidary groups in the 
economic sphere, as one of the most significant manifestations of collectiv-
ism and sometimes even appeal to introduce artel principles into modern 
organizations. But, in fact, this issue has been ignored by Russian re-
searchers over the last decades, remaining simply rhetorical. 
In this connection, it is very important and pressing to find out to what 
extent artelnost, and, in a broader sense, collectivism, determined, and still 
determines, the economic behavior of the Russian person. It is of great im-
portance both at the macroeconomic level for developing an appropriate 
government socio-economic policy and at the microeconomic level for im-
proving management styles used to run Russian companies, for working 
out adequate forms of labor organization and workers’ motivation by Rus-
sian managers. 
The subject of this article can be of interest to the readers also due to 
extreme scarcity of publications in English directly considering Russian ar-
tels. Indeed, you could count them on the fingers of one hand. Among 
rather resent publications there are papers of Y. Imai (1990), J. Bushnell 
(1990), and A. Wood (1990). However, the method used by the authors is 
mainly historical. Moreover, Bushnell’s and Wood’s papers are devoted to 
very specific topics. Imai’s paper examines artels and consumer coopera-
tives in Russia and the Ukraine in the 1860s and early 1870s basing itself 
on the observations of contemporary Russian authors on this subject. The 
socio-economic approach to artel is demonstrated in a profound, full of 
stimulating ideas, and in some way “classical” paper of Norbert Pincus un-
der the heading ‘Artel’ and published in 1902 in Economic Journal [Pin-
cus, 1902]. Pincus examined origin and discussed the principles governing 
the formation of Russian artels. 
The aim of this paper is to find out whether artelnost is in fact a basic 
institution of the Russian society. The paper focuses on checking the fol-
lowing hypothesis: the Russian person did not have a specific inherent mo-
tivating commitment to collective work in artels. The existence of artels in 
Russia was, to a large extent, due to a higher economic effectiveness of 
this organizational form of economic activity in some spheres. 
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The object of investigation is artel as an institutional form of economic 
activity in Russia in XIX — early XX centuries. Factors which helped ar-
tels come into being and remain relatively stable and common in the his-
toric past as well as the role of mental models in these processes are the 
subject of this investigation. This study is based on empirical descriptions 
of artels of the second half of XIX century, artels’ charters and written con-
tracts, statutes relating to artels and a wide range of historical literature. 
Alchian-Demsetz’ team production concept and Jensen-Meckling’s agency 
costs concept are used as an analytical tool. 
The first section of the paper briefly analyses literature on Russian 
mentality concerning one of its features such as collectivism or artelnost 
and suggests the criteria for estimation of artelnost. The second one de-
scribes artel as a form of economic activity in Russia, as formal and infor-
mal institution. The third section reveals Russian artelnost as a research ar-
tefact. The forth one gives evidence that artel can be interpreted as a way 
of solving team production problems. The final section summarizes the 
findings and suggests some implications. 
 
Collectivism as the Russian mentality feature 
Modern science cannot give a trustworthy prototype of the Russian 
person. In theoretical works the Russian person is quite inconsistent and 
even contradictory. On the one hand, he is unattractive because he tends to 
be a Utopist, disrespects private property and works hard only occasion-
ally. On the other hand, he is notable for his spiritual life, aspiration for 
freedom and independence, he regards work as the highest value, strives 
for justice and equality with the aim of serving people and the state. Col-
lectivism is often named by researchers as a typical feature of the Russian 
national character and mentality. They regard it as an informal, embedded 
institution of the Russian society.  
These statements go back to the middle of the XIX century when ex-
pectations of achieving rapid results after the Great Reforms were replaced 
by disappointment and, as a consequence of this a new trend in social men-
tality, which linked Russia’s future with a specific national way of devel-
opment, was born. It projected a distinctive non-capitalistic way of devel-
opment based on a collectivist principle. Implementation of this principle 
was to be carried out by maintaining and consolidating socio-economic 
forms which, according to researchers, were organically inherent in Russia, 
i.e. communes, cooperatives and artels. V. Vorontsov, a Russian populist 
(narodnik), specified that «our capitalistic manufacturing must be trans-
formed into a state or artel production», «our further industrial progress 
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will rest on truly people’s principles represented by communes and artels» 
[V. V., 1882, pp. 68, 309].1
Western scholars also actively study problems related to the Russian 
mentality [e.g.: The World of the Russian Peasant…, 1990; Kingston-
Mann and Mixter, 1991; Zviglyanich, 1993; The Russian Mentality…, 
1995]. It is almost commonly recognized that commitment to collective 
work is typical for the Russian culture and makes it completely different 
from Western cultures.  
O. Figes [Figes, 1996] and G. Hoskins [Hoskins, 1991] emphasize 
Russian people’s innate propensity for collective work. It is regarded as a 
particularly important feature of the Russian mentality which greatly influ-
ences management styles and practice in Russia [Lawrence and Vlachout-
sicos, 1990, p. 20]. D. Bollinger [Bollinger, 1994] also insists on the col-
lectivist nature of the Russian management culture. F. Trompenaars 
[Trompenaars, 1993] has come to different conclusions — according to 
public opinion polls, the level of individualism among Russian managers 
as well as other employees is extremely high. 
According to G. Hofstede’s estimations [Hofstede, 1994], Russian 
people’s values are only 50% collectivist, whereas the statistical data of 
Russian researchers who use Hofstede’s methods show the dominance of 
collectivist values [Naumov, 1996]. In the mid 1990s a survey of 53 coun-
tries including Russia was conducted within the Globe Project framework. 
According to the level of collective value development, Russia ranked 35, 
and the polled managers wished it were higher [Grachev, 1999, p. 30]. 
As it has been emphasized, modern Russian scholars regard Russia’s 
traditional version of collective work as artelnost [Yasin, 2003, p. 18], 
which is most clearly formulated by V. Ryazanov [Ryazanov, 1998, pp. 
330] who names «a specific propensity for collective work in the economic 
sphere», which becomes apparent in communes and artels, among princi-
pal sources of Russia’s economic system. He explains wide spreading of 
artel forms by their maximum suitability to the specifics of the country’s 
economic development and by conformity with behavior patterns of the 
population majority [Ryazanov, 1998, p. 344].  
That’s why the problem of finding out to what extent collective work 
has affected and still affects Russian people’s behavior is very pressing. 
Operationalisation of the artelnost notion. Cultural parameters such as 
individualism or collectivism are quite difficult to formalize, measure and 
express in quantitative terms. Modern assessments of collective work are 
carried out by means of field research on the basis of public opinion polls. 
When we try to assess the past, this approach is impossible. That’s why 
                                                          
1 See also: V. V., 1895a, 1895b. 
 6
historical assessments are made, as a rule, when analyzing statements, lit-
erary works, original documents, etc. 
In order to make the artelnost notion operational a new institutional 
economics tool will be used in this paper. In accordance with the theory of 
institutions and institutional transformations [Greif, 1994; 1998; Denzau 
and North, 1994] present institutions reflect actors’ cultural beliefs or men-
tal models because they form the motivation and incentive basis to set up 
certain institutions and, to a large extent, predetermine the formation of 
appropriate institutions. Acceptance or rejection of particular institutional 
types depends on the prevalence of this or that cultural belief. It was 
clearly stated by Denzau and North [Denzau and North, 1994] that in order 
to understand decision-making processes in conditions of great uncertainty 
it is necessary to find out connection between mental models created by 
people to comprehend the surrounding world, ideologies brought about by 
these models and institutions set up in the society to regulate interpersonal 
relationships. 
This study stresses the idea that in all approaches to interpret mental 
models and mentality, the latter becomes apparent in motivation, actions, 
economic and communication methods. Mentality, as a complex of intel-
lectual habits, beliefs, mental aims typical for some community or a group 
of people, and the state of mind, or a complex of behavior, mentality or 
judgemental patterns, ethical norms, the turn of mind, represents propen-
sity for acting in a particular way. 
Consequently, if artelnost had really been a traditional Russian version 
of collective work, it would have led to the creation of appropriate institu-
tions at all levels of the institutional hierarchy introduced by O. William-
son [Williamson 2000, pp. 596–599]. In informal, embedded institutions it 
should have become apparent as appropriate customs, traditions and 
norms, while at other levels it should have led to a continual spontaneous 
development of appropriate, stable and widely spread labor and economic 
forms, as well as formed the basis of successful institutional engineering, 
i.e. implementation of projected artel labor and economic forms in accor-
dance with these traditions by means of different measures including legis-
lative ones. 
Proceeding from the above-stated assumption, the following criteria, 
in my opinion, can be used to estimate artelnost: firstly, the extent to which 
artel labor and economic forms spread in all spheres of activity; secondly, 
for the most part spontaneous character of their emergence; and finally, in-
herent commitment to this organizational economic form, i.e. lack of op-
portunistic behavior in artels. 
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Artel as economic organization 
The history of artel traces back to its origins in the ninth- tenth centu-
ries. Artels, a kind of semi-formal associations for co-operative labor, were 
widely spread in Russia right up to the early twentieth century. 
There were a lot of artel types carrying out different work: of a spiri-
tual character: religious, entertaining, educational (joint subscriptions to 
newspapers and books, hire of teachers, etc.); nursing; communal; of 
thieves; of beggars; economic: agricultural, fishing, production, handicraft, 
trading, building, etc. Artel’s forms and operation areas were so varied that 
they make it impossible to describe and classify them in detail. 
S.Y. Vitte divided artels into three groups [Vitte, 1997 (1912),  
p. 18–20]. 
Group 1 included artels which had been known from ancient times, 
e.g. artels of fishermen, carpenters, diggers, reapers, mowers, etc., had a 
simple organizational structure and were guided not by written charters and 
agreements, but by tradition. It can be said that relationships among such 
artels’ members were regulated by a kind of a contract which was not ob-
vious and conditions of which had not been necessarily talked over in ad-
vance because they were well known to everybody. Artels of this kind 
were formed either by the members themselves or by a contractor. An 
agreement with the contractor was, as a rule, reached orally. These artels 
were formed for a relatively short term to complete a set of tasks, had a 
small number of members, one of whom was made the artel’s head, i.e. 
starosta. Members were, as a rule, peasants who did seasonal work or rep-
resentatives of the lower middle classes. 
Group 2 consisted of artels which were formed for a long term, had 
charters and partially the features of capitalist enterprises. It included ex-
change (birzhevaya), customs and other artels. Their members’ duties were 
diverse. They provided loading and unloading of goods, packed and dis-
patched various cargoes, guarded warehouses, received and paid money. 
Sometimes they were given big sums of money to carry because their em-
ployers trusted them. Besides that, artel members fulfilled other duties for 
their employers: they worked in offices as assistants and errand boys. Quite 
often they did household chores. The members of the other group of ex-
change artels were employed as clerks and messengers in banks, commer-
cial establishments and in the railway administration. Such artels had quite 
a large membership, a more complicated management structure which had 
other bodies apart from starosta. They often employed workers, which 
made them similar to capitalist enterprises. 
Group 3 was composed of production artels, i.e. industrial enterprises 
formed by workers themselves. Their capital was made up of membership 
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fees and loans. Profit was either equally divided among the artel’s mem-
bers or in proportion to their labor and invested capital. Associations of 
this kind first came into being in France but they didn’t become common 
everywhere. 
This paper focuses on artels which employed collective work because 
it is the subject of this study. They include labor artels proper (a group of 
workers offering their collective services as builders, diggers, loaders, por-
ters, etc. for pay) and production artels of a pure labor type where all 
workers are owners of the plant and the goods they produce, there are no 
hired workers, the head is elected by the workers. 
Artel as a formal and informal institution. The word ‘artel’ was used 
in legislative documents for the first time in the middle of the XVII century 
replacing the word ‘vataga’ (crowd). It was formalized as an institutional 
economic form in 1799 in Guilds’ Charter where in Chapter XIV «On 
work done by artels» artel members’ rights and duties were finally defined. 
According to the definition formulated in Clause 1, «work or a task which 
is beyond one worker’s capabilities can be done by common consent by a 
group of workers, and such groups must be called artels» [Ustav tsekhov, 
1799]. Clause 4 also had some important information on artels. It read that 
«each artel member must be responsible for the incurred damage or losses 
and guarantee payment». 
The artel definition was specified in the 1823 Statute which ran that 
«artel means that each worker is responsible for everybody in artel and the 
whole artel is responsible for each worker, they are paid from a common 
fund (duvan) and work is done collectively» [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy 
poshliny…, 1823, art. 4]. The same definitions were used in the Trade 
Charter, and in the XIX — early XX centuries artels were specified as «as-
sociations of workers set up voluntarily to carry out work or production 
which is beyond one worker’s capabilities» [Ustav torgoviy, 1912, 
Art. 79]. 
Labor artel Statute was passed on June 1, 1902 in which labor artels 
were defined as «partnerships set up to carry out specific work or produc-
tion as well as provide services by participants’ personal involvement at 
their expense by collective guarantee». A similar definition was given in 
the Civil Statute [Zakony grazhdanskiye, 1906, Art. 21981]. Labor artels 
were established in accordance with either charters or agreements. 
Artels managed by charters were obliged to observe the following 
rules. Their charters were submitted to the governor for approval and pub-
lished in local newspapers. Any person, male or female, over 17 years old 
could become an artel member. But under-21s had no right to participate in 
management. Membership was not limited but it couldn’t be less than 5 
people. It was managed by the general meeting. Meetings took place only 
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if not less than half of the members were present. Every member had one 
vote. Decisions were made by a majority of votes. More important deci-
sions required the presence of 2/3 of its members. Membership fees were 
the same for everybody and could be paid in cash or in kind. If sums paid 
to the cashier exceeded fees, they were considered as loans. Wages were 
paid to all members in accordance with the resolution of the general meet-
ing regardless of the sums in each member’s account. Artel used its assets 
to cover all losses and meet liabilities. If artel’s assets were insufficient, its 
members’ private property was claimed in its entirety or in the amount 
specified in the Charter. All chartered artels enjoyed the rights of entities, 
i.e. they could buy assets, sign agreements, sue and be sued, set up or take 
on lease industrial or trade facilities. 
As for production artels formed in accordance with contracts, their 
structure and management were not regulated by jurisdiction. 
Thus, the most important features of artels in Russia were as follows: 
• voluntary membership; 
• personal involvement in artel’s activities binding for all members; 
• collective guarantee (krugovaya poruka), i.e. all members shared re-
sponsibility for the damage and losses;  
• besides that, amendments to the 1823 Guilds Charter stated that any-
one wishing to be an exchange artel member must pay an admittance 
fee.  
These formal principles of managing artel’s activities supported by the 
legislation strengthened the rules used by artels at the time and which were 
full of generalities. The only thing regularly highlighted by various state 
decrees on objects of management was the necessity of each member to 
carry responsibility for artel. 
As far as artels’ structure, relationships among members, their con-
tracts and agreements are concerned, there was hardly any legislation on 
that, and published artels’ charters and contracts differed significantly from 
each other. That’s why formal principles were supplemented with infor-
mal, widely spread procedures spontaneously formed over artels’ long his-
tory. These principles include taking decisions by a vote at the general 
meeting, electing management, equality in profit sharing for the same labor 
input. Admittance criteria were also similar. The following things were 
taken into consideration: 
• gender; 
• place of residence; 
• age; 
• physical strength; 
• skills; 
• property status; 
 10
• no other jobs; 
• moral qualities (soberness was valued most highly). 
These criteria were to provide artel members with work on equal terms 
in return for their commitment to work in artel’s interests. Honest work 
was also guaranteed by: 
• admittance fee in some artels; 
• references (until the admittance fee is fully paid); 
• tests; 
• trial period; 
• penalties; 
• risk of expulsion from artel; 
• collective guarantee. 
 
Russian artelnost as a research artefact 
Here’s a question to consider. Did the Russian person really have 
some innate propensity for collective work and give priority to public goals 
over his own? Section I of this paper provides the following criteria which 
make it possible to assess the extent of artelnost as mentality feature: the 
extent to which artel labor and economic forms spread in all spheres of ac-
tivity; for the most part spontaneous character of their emergence; and in-
herent commitment to this organizational economic form, i.e. lack of op-
portunistic behavior in artels. Let’s consider each of these aspects. 
Were artels really ubiquitous? A lot of modern scholars insist that ar-
tels as economic form were ubiquitous in Russia. In particular, B. Mi-
ronov, a historian specializing in social history, is one of them. In his two-
volume investigation of Russian social history he writes that «besides 
communes in rural and suburban areas, they [peasants] developed a kin-
dred organizational form, artel, which we see in every place where people 
are involved in specific activities beyond peasants’ and settlement com-
munes» [Mironov, 2003, V. 1, p. 525–526]. 
But a thorough study of facts casts doubt on the simplicity of this con-
clusion. Only Group 1 artels were quite common. But their functioning 
was, first of all, restricted by activities which, as a matter of fact, required 
labor cooperation, and secondly, such artels disintegrated upon completing 
the task. 
Labor production artels, were not as common as they are sometimes 
described. First of all production artel’s «natural habitat» was quite narrow 
and was confined within a) activities of low capital investment, simple 
homogeneous job and labor with primitive equipment and technology; 
b) lower classes of population. Artel in its «pure» forms did not survive in 
other spheres. Indeed only two production artel types were common and 
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successful in Russia, i.e. butter manufacturing and exchange ones. Exactly 
these artel types are often referred to when proving that artelnost is inher-
ent in the Russian national character. Let’s consider each type in detail. 
There were 51 butter manufacturing artels in Russia in 1901; in 1917 
their number was 3,000. They were not of a labor type though, because 
hired workers were engaged in butter manufacturing. Small milk producers 
owned these artels, managed the manufacturing process personally and col-
laborated with other owners only when selling milk. Consequently, a butter 
manufacturing artel is a selling cooperative, a processing partnership. The 
butter belonged not to the producers but to the milk suppliers. Profits were 
divided in proportion to the supplied milk, not by shares [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1989 [1919], p. 102]. Such artels emerged in Russia in late 
1860s. They were initiated by N. Vereshchagin, a gentleman by birth, who 
borrowed the idea from Switzerland and had been introducing it actively in 
Russia since 1865.2 The first artels didn’t live long. One of the reasons of 
their failure was that peasants were not prepared for them. They gave no 
credence to this economic form. Their attitude to innovations was that of 
opposition. That’s why Vereshchagin made every effort to convince them 
of advantages of dairying artels. Butter and cheese manufacturing artels 
started springing up again only in late 1890s and became common only 
when peasants came to understand that it was a paying business, and it had 
advantages over other forms, including capitalistic. 
As for exchange artels regulations on them were passed on June 16, 
1905. They were quit similar to the Labor Artel Statute. In accordance with 
Clause 1, «exchange artels aim at carrying out work related to acceptance, 
dispatch and storage of goods as well as fulfilling office tasks and trading 
with organizations and individuals» [O pravilakh dlya birzhevykh ar-
teley…, 1905]. Exchange artels could function only in accordance with the 
charter which was approved by the Exchange Committees. Thus, exchange 
artels’ activities were based on clearly defined rules, meeting of liabilities 
being guaranteed collectively by the insurance policy. At the same time 
they hired outside laborers, their members were paid by the day and by the 
piece and due to these features these associations were not artels in their 
true sense because they did not meet all artel’s requirements. As a conse-
quence exchange artels could not be considered as “artel”, which was offi-
cially recognized by the 1823 Statute [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy posh-
liny…, 1823]. And the fact that “they are, really, artels only in names” was 
absolutely correctly stressed by Pincus [Pincus, 1902, p. 487]. 
                                                          
2 See a series of articles of Vereshchagin (1999 [1892], 1999 [1870], 1999 [1869], and 
1999 [1865]). 
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As far as labor artels which used collective work are concerned, they 
became common only in the spheres of activity which didn’t require big 
investments, complicated machinery, where work was homogeneous and 
could be divided into equal parts and done by individual workers, in other 
words, where people simply cooperated to do a job. Artels were mainly 
formed to produce goods in the absence of expensive machinery and great 
technical expertise [Yarotsky, 1898, p. 22]. N. Kalachev [1999 (1864), p. 
308] described artel as part of the common people’s life and relationships. 
The last aspect was also admitted by Pincus [Pincus, 1902, p. 496] who de-
fined artel ‘as an association for co-operative labour formed by the lower 
classes of the population themselves usually under pressure of extreme 
need and therefore strongly imbued with that spirit of local solidarity 
which the conditions of life have developed in the Russian, and also ruled 
by the customs and laws of the local Mir, the Russian village community’.3
Production artels of a pure labor type were very rare everywhere. 
Great Britain had only one artel of this type in 1916, whereas Germany had 
none. There were about a hundred small production artels in France due to 
the support from the government bodies, public institutions or individuals. 
Only big Italian agricultural artels achieved success without any support. 
But their aim was to fight unemployment, and their members had more 
than one job. In Russia, production labor artels didn’t become common ei-
ther. According to I. Sapozhnikov [Sapozhnikov 1916, p. 14], there were 
only 16 artels in Moscow in 1908, 60 in 1909, and about 115 by 1916. 
However, none of them developed into a big enterprise. They were small 
workshops which either died or turned into small capitalist enterprises. 
Sapozhnikov thinks that shortage of working capital and mainly absence of 
                                                          
3 However it is necessary to stress that artel and peasant commune as organizational 
forms of production were quite different. In Russian peasant commune property rights 
regimes were of different types. There were communal property rights in arable land, 
hayfields, mills, wharfs. Arable land and hayfields were subjected to equally reparti-
tions according to definite criteria. Mills and wharfs were usually leased with income 
at commune’s disposal. Common property resources (the commons) included 
wasteland, grazing land, rivers, and woodlands. However good-quality woodland was 
usually parceled out. Inherited by the family members plots of land attached to houses 
in the village used for growing vegetables, fruit, and so on. There were also obligatory 
public tillage (obshchestvennye zapashki), when some communal arable land was cul-
tivated collectively and the crop was stored in so-called «storage shops» (zapasnyie 
magaziny) as a form of insurance against crop failure. Egalitarian principle concerned 
only land distribution not income because household allotments were cultivated by 
users individually. Moreover equal repartition was not “spontaneous order” but an 
institutional answer on governmental tax policy, namely equal poll tax imposed by 
Peter I and collective responsibility to pay taxes. Collective responsibility was almost 
outdated by 1900. About 99% of communes did not use it. 
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organizational, technical and institutional support caused the failure of 
those artels. 
As far as agricultural artels are concerned, of all types of cooperation 
peasants could form, these were the rarest. As it is written in one of the 
early XX century articles on agricultural artels, «at present we have not 
more than a few dozens of big agricultural artels in Russia which would 
buy or rent land collectively with a view to working jointly on it» 
[Gorovaya, 1916, p. 8–9]. This phenomenon was caused, according to 
Gorovaya, by two things. Firstly, artel members often had to give up habits 
and propensities acquired in childhood and inherited from the previous 
generations. They had to conform to the actions and desires of their fellow-
workers, but neither household possession nor the compulsive order in the 
commune taught peasants to be compliant. «Sometimes they champion 
their interests passionately but at other times they submit to the decision 
made by the majority of artel members out of necessity» [Gorovaya, 1916, 
p. 6]. Secondly, differences in peasants’ property status, capacity for work 
and intellectual faculties hampered artels’ activities. 
Only one big production artel lived long in Russia and proved to be 
viable. It was a knife-producing artel in the village of Pavlovo in Nizhe-
gorodskaya province which was set up in 1890 and supported by individu-
als, public institutions and the state. However, Pavlovo artel gave so few 
benefits to its members that hired workers did not want to join it [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1989 [1919], p. 207]. 
Were artels really spontaneous? Spontaneity can be discussed only in 
relation to Group 1 artels. But even their labor organization in some cases 
was stipulated by law. For example, according to the statute of 1836, free 
workers hired by the owners of inland ships had to be grouped in artels. 
Workers who came from the same village, small rural district or town had 
to form an artel from there in order to make it easier to form a bigger artel 
with mutual guarantee [Ustavy putei soobshcheniya, 1912, ats.324, 326]. 
In accordance with legislation Ust’insky seal-hunting in Mezensky bay had 
to be done exclusively by artels [Ustav sel'skogo hozyaistva (1912), ats. 
519, 520]. 
Researchers note that sometimes artels were compulsorily formed by 
the head of the rural district or town authorities to provide jobs to artel’s 
members so that they could pay duties and cover arrears [Orshanskii, 1875, 
p.185; Kalachev, p.37; Sbornick materialov…, II, p.125]. 
In 1823 members of the Saint Petersburg exchange artel asked for a 
permission not to pay a 40-rouble duty to the state treasury to become ar-
tel’s members. They referred to the fact that the name for the artel was 
chosen by their owners [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy poshliny…]. 
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Other collective forms of labor in Russia were often introduced delib-
erately and to a considerable degree were connected with the non-
economic coercion and propagation. Deliberate creation of labor produc-
tion artels by some enthusiasts required much time, effort and investments 
from them. It has been mentioned above how much energy and efforts N. 
Vereshchagin put into the creation of butter-producing artels. Agricultural 
artels’ existence, like that of butter manufacturing ones, was mainly due to 
enthusiasts’ activities. It was Nikolai Levitsky who organized the first ag-
ricultural artel in Russia in 1896 and who was called ‘artel’s batko’ (ideo-
logical leader) by peasants. On the other hand he pointed out that labor ar-
tels in general and production artels in particular were the most difficult 
types of cooperation to put into practice. «It is not an easy task. It requires 
that peasants have plenty of stamina, developed self-consciousness and 
great initiative» [Levitsky, 1916, p. 4]. He pointed out that the society re-
jected this form of production organization, that «artels were the most ne-
glected form of cooperation» unlike consumer, credit or loan-saving socie-
ties which were under the patronage of the community, zemstvo or state. 
The Pavlovo knife-producing artel owes its origin to A. G. Shtange, an 
engineer-technologist who settled in Pavlovo at the end of the 1890s, to an 
interest-free loan from S. T. Morozov, a Moscow plant owner and to two 
young engineers, Yefremov and Zelgeim, who gave the artel all their 
knowledge and time in exchange for modest earnings. 
Opportunistic behavior in artels. Opportunistic behavior, «self-
interest-seeking-with-guile» or calculated dishonesty according to the defi-
nition given by O. Williamson [Williamson 1996, p. 689], implies pursuing 
one’s own goals, sometimes perfidiously and unethically, which interfere 
with an institution’s interests. Postcontracting opportunism becomes ap-
parent in the form of shirking, extorting and blackmailing. Consequently, 
opportunistic behavior can testify to disregard of collective interests. Dis-
cipline (labor, technological, economic, etc.) is crucial in cooperation. Was 
there any discipline in artels? Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate the 
actual scale of opportunistic behavior in artels. 
For example, no special penal books in exchange artels preserved. To 
protect artel’s reputation after the year was over, and all payments made, 
artel’s financial books were destroyed making it impossible to see whether 
any member had been fined or not [Kalachev, 1999 [1864], p. 322]. How-
ever, the destruction of the books in itself testifies to the problem of im-
proper attitude to work. Embezzlement was the main problem in exchange 
artels’ activities. Newspapers of the early XX century were full of embez-
zlement facts, misappropriated sums amounting to 200,000 roubles, which 
was a huge amount at the time. That’s why one of the reports made at the 
first all-Russia convention of exchange artel representatives was on rein-
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forcement of responsibility for embezzlement [Vserossiysky s'ezd predsta-
viteley …, 1912]. 
Opportunistic behavior was common practice in artels. In his paper on 
artel development in Russia, G. Petrov [Petrov 1917, pp. 66–67] points out 
that attempts to make artels common failed. They failed to overcome nega-
tive features inherent in other forms of cooperation. Minutes of general 
meetings mentioned quarrels, envy and favoritism, lack of self-
consciousness and self-discipline, and poor attendance at meetings. Be-
cause of that, management had to either impose penalties or pay for attend-
ing meetings. Not all artel members worked for it. Plenty of them used ar-
tel’s raw materials for work somewhere else, sometimes for artel’s com-
petitors. 
In butter-manufacturing artels members spoilt milk by adding water, 
some other substances, by no keeping within technological processes. Even 
such an adept artel’s advocate as M. Slobozhanin [Slobozhanin, 1919, p. 
14] stated that artels’ reality was a far cry from their ideals embodied 
«people’s aspirations for a better financial standing, freedom, equality, 
democracy, consciousness, dignity, friendship, fraternity, etc.». 
These facts prove once again that Russian people did not have any 
special propensity for working in artels as a way to meet their needs to 
work communally, and that the main reason for joining them was of eco-
nomic nature. Collective work was only a means which enabled people to 
make money in initial conditions and types of jobs. 
In practice, production artels operating both abroad and in Russia 
were either ineffective or turned into capitalist enterprises, which is dem-
onstrated quite convincingly in one of the articles of the late XIX century 
[P-r, 1897]. Many researchers pointed out that a lot of artels which origi-
nally were workers’ unions turned into entrepreneurs’ unions. Hands were 
hired to do work, whereas artel members managed them and gained profits. 
Thus, the very essence of artel as a workers’ union was destroyed. In this 
connection, wage labor in artels was restricted by law. Artels’ charters had 
to stipulate terms and the procedure of employment as well as the number 
of hired workers. Hired workers were allowed to work in artels only on a 
temporary basis in exceptional cases. These regulations artificially con-
fined evolution of artels to capitalistic concerns and conserved this primi-
tive form of economic activity. 
Researchers of XIX — early XX centuries put forward some reasons 
why production artels did not succeed. They were summarized by Tugan-
Baranovsky [Tugan-Baranovsky, 1989 [1919], p. 196] and were as follow-
ing: lack of discipline among artel members; the employer’s absence and 
the elected leader’s weak authority with the result that his decisions are ig-
nored, with workers putting their interests first; the leader selected from 
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within, as a rule, does not have enough expertise and management skills; 
workers’ technical backwardness, weak propensity for innovations and im-
plementation of modern technology; workers do not tend to use new pro-
duction methods; no freedom in selecting staff. Staff consists only of artel 
members. A new member represents a threat to the benefits which artel has 
due to its old members’ effort. That’s why, if artel is successful, introduc-
tion of new members leads to old members’ losing part of their benefits. 
To sum up, it is worth to quote M. Tugan-Baranovsky [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1997 (1907), pp. 495–496; 498–499] who wrote that “despite 
all profuse talk about Russian people’s unusual propensity for working col-
lectively, enthusiasm for associations and artels had no roots in Russia, and 
that’s why it brought no fruitful results. General praising of artels did not 
result in creating a single, stable artel and did not lead to the emergence of 
a cooperative movement somewhat similar to that in Europe. The individu-
alistic West with its different political systems turned out to be more tai-
lored to accept artel principles than communal Russia”. 
Nevertheless, the question why artels were common in Russia is still 
open. 
According to Pincus [Pincus, 1902, pp. 489, 493] the artel forced 
into existence 1) in the first instance by economic pressure, i.e. inefficiency 
of individual efforts due to peculiar geographical features of Russia (in-
clement and uncertain climate; vast and monotonous surface; lack of fertile 
soil; inadequate for effective intercommunication river systems; paralyzing 
influence of the long distances), 2) by Russia’s historical vicissitudes, in 
particular Mongol-Tartar influence, and 3) by curiously complicated prob-
lems of ethnography in Russia. 
Some of these arguments are undoubtedly valid but need to be added 
one which seems to be decisive in the explanation of persistence of Rus-
sian artel in nineteenth — early twentieth centuries. Labor artels, as an in-
stitutional form, were a good way of solving a classical teamwork prob-
lems and enabled to considerably cut agency costs. 
 
Labor artels as team production 
Work in artels can be considered as teamwork. A team is a group of 
individuals with common aims who divide work among themselves and 
carry responsibility for achieving certain results. Team members are inter-
dependent because to achieve common aims they need the results of the 
work done by their fellow-workers. The team’s main difference from tradi-
tional formal work groups is synergy effect (i.e. total amount of work done 
by the team exceeds the sum of their individual work). Teamwork is 
widely used at present. Teams are formed when it is economically benefi-
 17
cial, regardless of which culture, collective or individualist, prevails in the 
society. 
Using D. McIntoch-Fletcher’s team criteria artel can be classified as 
an intact team type in contrast to a cross-functional one. An intact team is 
usually a production unit or a long-standing group of workers producing a 
certain product or service. It can have a leader who is not a team member, 
and whose duty is to coordinate work and secure order. In other cases the 
team can have a leader from within. In some cases team members can play 
the leading role in turn. McIntoch-Fletcher [McIntoch-Fletcher, 1996] 
points out that quite developed mature autonomous intact teams can oper-
ate as small enterprises. 
There are four team types according to their aims: consultative (deal-
ing with management); production (teams of production workers, miners, 
repairmen, etc.); project (research and planning groups, etc.); action (sport 
teams, for example). From this point of view, artel can be defined as a pro-
duction team. 
The problem of teamwork production and methods of monitoring was 
analyzed in a well-known article by A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz [Al-
chian and Demsetz 1972]. Teamwork entails big transaction costs: organ-
izational, of monitoring, disciplining, assessing each member’s contribu-
tion to the production output. «Team production will be relied upon… if 
there is a net increase in productivity available by team production, net of 
the metering cost associated with disciplining the team» [Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972, p. 780]. 
Alchian-Demsetz’ study was a starting point for a number of articles, 
including an article by M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling in which they in-
troduce the notion of agency costs. According to them, in most agency re-
lationships the principal and the agent incur positive costs of monitoring as 
well as bonding costs in a monetary or non-monetary form. Besides, there 
are the principal’s residual losses as a result of discrepancies between the 
agent’s solutions and the solutions that could have maximized the princi-
pal’s financial standing [Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308]. 
In his paper ‘Teamwork and moral hazard’, B. Holmstrom demon-
strated that the free rider problem could be solved to a great extent if own-
ership had been at least partially separated from the workers, which gives 
priority to capitalist firms over partnerships. Labor contribution rating sys-
tem can help to overcome a moral hazard threat because it divides risks in 
a more favorable way. Of great importance are the following questions: 
whether the agents can come to a mutual agreement while using this work 
assessment method; what monitoring methods are used; how the output is 
divided among team members, including the subject of monitoring, in or-
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der to work out the most effective incentives for work [Holmstrom, 1982, 
pp. 338–339]. 
The structure of principal-agent relationships in artels was quite com-
plicated. On the one hand, the owner who hired artel workers to do a job, 
played the role of the principal while artel was an aggregate agent. At the 
same time the owner quite often signed agreements with individual artel 
members when, for example, he hired them himself, as it was in barge 
hauling artels, or if he employed them to do some household chores, which 
was common practice in exchange artels. On the other hand, artel itself 
served as the principal towards artel members, but at the same time they 
jointly controlled artel activities because important decisions were made at 
the general meeting. 
Labor artels had quite successful mechanisms of lowering different 
transaction costs resulting from team production: 
• by preventing possible opportunism; 
• by measuring productivity and remuneration; 
• by solving a free rider problem when one member’s shirking affects 
the rest of the team. 
Prevention of opportunist behavior in artels. Admittance criteria, such 
as a property status, moral qualities of a member-to-be and an admittance 
fee which was, as a rule, quite high, were preventive measures against op-
portunist behavior before signing a contract with the worker — screening 
mechanisms. For example, admittance depended on «paying, on average, 
up to 1,000 silver roubles [Kalachev, 1999 (1864), pp. 320, 324]. Thus, to 
become a member of Metelkin artel at St. Petersburg’s Marine Exchange, a 
candidate had to pay a fee of 900 roubles to artel in 1812, 200 roubles paid 
at the time of joining it [Kalachev, 1999 (1864), p. 350]. At that time it was 
a huge amount of money which could be earned only by a hard working 
person with entrepreneurial skills. The fact of having this sum signalled 
that the candidate had all the necessary qualities. 
The problem of dealing with false information about candidates was 
partially solved by finding out the truth in the neighborhood where they 
lived because they had to give information on the place of residence. Ref-
erences also played an important role. Thus, candidates were, to some ex-
tent, screened because of admittance criteria. Besides being a signal, the 
admittance fee, according to Jensen-Meckling’s terminology, played the 
role of bonding costs, as the member who was about to be expelled from 
artel because of his inadequate behavior, lost a part or the whole sum of the 
collateral. 
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Collective guarantee was a powerful factor which undoubtedly made 
postcontractual opportunist behavior less probable.4 But it could not pre-
vent it completely. That’s why artel members were paid accordingly: they 
could be punished for their demerits in accordance with artel rules or reso-
lutions passed at the general meeting. The inflicted punishments included 
fines, corporal punishment, removal from work and even expulsion. The 
list of demerits and the size of fines varied in different artels. For example, 
in Metelkin artel which was mentioned above, a member had to pay a 5-
rouble fine for being absent from work, for abusing other members, for not 
being as hard working as them, or being drunk at work. If a member had an 
additional job without having let artel know about it, he had to pay 25 rou-
bles [Kalachev, 1999 (1864), p. 350]. One of artels in 1810 had a rule of 
imposing a big fine on a member causing trouble between the employer (or 
‘master’ as members of artel called him) and the members [Kalachev, 1999 
(1864), p. 349]. Some artel charters ordered its members to inform on their 
fellow-workers if they misbehaved. If they did not do that, they were also 
severely punished. Such practice seemed to be common because this type 
of mutual monitoring considerably lowered costs related to it. 
One of the ways of fighting shirking suggested by Alchian and Dem-
setz involves selecting of a special subject who monitors the team’s per-
formance. However, the problem is that the subject can shirk himself. 
There was a controller in each artel (starosta (headman), desyatnik (charge-
hand), ataman) who besides getting his share of pay, as a rule, was paid 
some extra money as a bonus for his work, but was fined if he misbehaved. 
Thus, exchange artels were run by persons, either selected from within 
who did it in turn, or elected at the general meeting. The “manager” (staro-
sta) was usually elected for a one-year period. If he coped with his duties 
well, he could be re-elected for a new term. His duties included securing 
artel’s money, assigning tasks to members, checking their completion, im-
posing petty fines. The elected starosta was specially remunerated for his 
work whereas the person who played this role in turn, did not get any extra 
pay for that. 
Fishing and hunting artels always had a head who was paid four to 
seven times more than an ordinary member. Barge hauling artels paid 
equally to all members including the elected desyatnik for their work but 
he was paid a special remuneration for additional duties. 
Thus, artel can be defined as a coalition of agents with a revolving 
leadership structure where agents participated in profit making as well as 
                                                          
4 Grameen bank set up in Bangladesh by a 2006 Noble Prize winner, Muhhamad Unus, 
is a good modern example of giving out loans, taking into account collective guarantee 
as a tool to solve the problem of adverse selection and prevent agents’ opportunism. 
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took turns in playing the role of the principal. Rotation of agents in the 
principal position with the authority delegated to them to control the other 
members’ actions resulted in exchanging reliable information, creating the 
necessary prerequisites for strengthening trustworthy relationships among 
agents and developing cooperation, which in turn led to creating an «asso-
ciative atmosphere» within the organization which prevented opportunist 
behavior and maximized feasibility [Williamson, 1975, pp. 38, 44]. Per-
sonal or collective contracts with an employer served as an additional pro-
tection from opportunism in artels, e. g. there were detailed laws regulating 
relationships among barge haulers and ship owners. Thus, conflicts could 
be settled both unofficially and in court, shipping and arbitrary courts be-
ing in charge of that. 
Measurement cost cuts in artels. Payment for work done by artel 
members was made in accordance with the capital or effort contributed by 
each of them. Profits were usually divided equally among the members, 
fines being deducted after that. Sometimes the amount of labor input, on 
rarer occasions the level of expertise, were taken into account to calculate 
workers’ pay. Measuring of individual input entailed transaction costs. 
Cutting of these costs was mainly achieved by setting up artels to carry out 
simple one-type jobs. Work could be either divided into quantitatively 
equal parts and assigned to separate workers, as it was done for loading 
and unloading, digging, mowing, forest cutting jobs, or it simply required 
joint effort, as in barge hauling. 
Another important thing was that labor, as a production factor, was 
relatively homogeneous because physical strength and skills were taken 
into account when hiring artel members. This team formation principle was 
common everywhere. According to A. Engelgardt [Engelgardt, 1995, p. 
146], «peasants do not agree to mow collectively by forming a line. It is 
possible only when artel is formed by 4–5 workers with similar capabili-
ties». 
The discussion of agency costs issue would be incomplete without 
consideration of interrelationship between artel’s organizational structure 
and the decision process. E. Fama and M. Jensen [Fama and Jensen, 1983] 
put forward a question of how to divide among the agents such functions 
as: 1) decision management (decision initiation and implementation); 
2) decision control (decision ratification and monitoring), and 3) a residual 
risk bearing in order to ensure economic efficiency. According to them, in 
small, non-complex organizations it is reasonable to make one or several 
agents responsible for these functions because if the number of residual 
claimants is great, their participation in decision control entails consider-
able costs. Artels were for the most part small non-complex organizations. 
But the above-mentioned functions were not separated here. All three func-
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tions were placed in the hands of the same individuals. The key reason was 
collective guarantee. All members carried risk equally being responsible 
for the damage and losses. In return all members had equal rights for resid-
ual claims and the management and control of important decisions at gen-
eral meetings. Non-separated functions of risk bearing and decision-
making lowered the profits, but they were possibly compensated by cutting 
metering costs and less opportunism due to collective guarantee. 
Concluding remarks 
Modern statements about Russian artelnost based on the conclusions 
of the past seem to be mainly rhetorical. Analysis reveals that assertion of 
Russian people’s artelnost has no supported evidence. The following crite-
ria were used to estimate artelnost: the extent to which artel labor and eco-
nomic forms spread in all spheres of activity; for the most part spontaneous 
character of artels emergence; and inherent commitment to this organiza-
tional economic form, i.e. lack of opportunistic behavior in artels. 
Existence of artels in Russia was, to a large extent, due to a higher 
economic effectiveness of this organizational form of economic activity in 
some spheres. Principal-agent and team production approaches highlight 
that Russian artel as an economic organization can be interpreted as an ef-
fective way for solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The 
behavior of artels’ members was rational and quite individualistic. 
Labor artels were mainly confined within activities of low capital in-
vestment and uncomplicated machinery. Work was homogeneous and the 
job could be divided into quantitatively equal parts. 
Practically, the only asset used to carry out simple homogeneous work 
was workers’ human capital, which could lead to extra opportunistic be-
havior. That’s why artel as a contract-based institutional type came into be-
ing to control it. 
Production artels in Russia were not common. They did not live long. 
A lot of XIX — early XX century researchers considered long-term coop-
eration of producers and artels completely unpractical in Russia. Even 
those who believed in their future stressed the necessity of coercing people 
who worked by themselves into these economic organizations. It was also 
important that the government, local self-government bodies (zemstva), 
and individual sponsors should support them. The researchers involuntarily 
pointed out that they were of contradictory character.  
So one shouldn’t exaggerate the role of artel in the process of Russian 
development. 
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